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Summary 
We believe that a research protocol must be 
established where safety technology 1s developed at a 
parallel rate to engineering and scientific advances 
of emerging energy systems. Safety sciences are 
traditionally given low priority during the 
developing stages of new technologies. Indeed, 
safety efforts are often considered counter 
productive, and funding for safety equipment and 
programs are not proportional to overall project 
budgets; i.e., minimum safety requirements are 
generally specified by local and/or federal codes. 
All project funding is allocated such that safety 
programs always meet the minimum standards. Seldom 
1s a safety posture in excess of minimum standards 
considered. 
The Department of Energy (DOE) attempted to 
initiate a positive energy safety program 1n 1975, 
when the Tusion-Laser, Safety Coordinating Committee 
(FL/SCC) was inaugurated. The purpose of the FL/SCC 
was to identify hazards unique to fusion energy 
experiments and future fusion power reactors, and to 
recommend research programs to develop 
countermeasures for the hazards. However, the FL/SCC 
died in approximately two years because of lack of 
interest. 
Concurrent to and persisting after the efforts of 
the FL/SCC, the Operational and Environmental Safety 
(OES) Divison of DOE supported a modest effort at the 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) to study the fire 
risk of generic fusion energy experiments. The goals 
of this program parallel those of the FL/SCC only in 
the specific areas of fire risk, and developing fire 
countermeasures. 
We used a fault tree analysis (FTA) to study the 
fire-management systems of two LLL fusion experiments 
(2XIIB and SHIVA). This technique identified failure 
modes of existing system components and indicated 
what the effects of component failure might be in the 
event of fire in the protected spaces. This paper 
describes the results of the initial analytical phase 
of the project and indicates critical unknown 
parameters required for further analysis. Moreover, 
the analytical procedures we have developed are 
applicable to most, if not all, safety disciplines 
and could serve as a basis for the logical 
reestablishment of the FL/SCC by DOE. 
Introduction 
An electrical failure occurred in the polystyrene 
insulation between a high voltage capacitor connector 
and the capacitor supporting rack in a capacitor bank 
* Work performed under the auspices of the U.S. 
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test facility. A high-voltage arc developed, 
igniting the polystyrene. The energy and duration of 
the subsequent fire was sufficient to fuse a fire 
sprinkler, which extinguished the fire. The actual 
sequence of events leading to the fire has not been 
defined but it was determined that: 
• It was the result of an unknown elertrical 
fault. 
• The fire growth rate was slow so that smoke 
production was large. 
• The fire was first indicated by an electrical 
interlock failure. 
• Costs ($?3,000) were confined to repair of: 
structural supports, minor electrical 
components, soot and water damage, and fire 
department venting procedures. 
Fortunately, the fire site was isolated so that the 
smoke was confined to the capacitor enclosure, thus 
there was no communication of smoke or heat to laser 
components. The facility was sprinklered and of 
relatively low volume. Physical damage was slight 
but programmatic delay was substantial. Smoke 
detectors have now been installed so that operators 
will have a much earlier indication of electrical 
faults with the potential for initiatino destructive 
fires. 
The above event is typical of the fire experience 
record for DOE-funded energy technology experiments. 
{Indeed, the fire record for all DOE facilities is 
much better than the general U.S. industrial 
experience, and they average far less than the 
123,000 incurred above.)' However, in this case we 
failed to recognize the substantial loss that can 
accrue from a rather benign fire; after we 
expei ienced the event, we recognized dnd funded 
effective countermeasures. Therefore, we are guilty 
of practicing responsive rather than predictive 
fire-safety procedures. Clearly, the reverse ought 
to be the rule. 
The current status of contemporary fire-
management strategies is based on data from 
residential and industrial fire experience. Many 
fire-management components have been pragmatically 
developed and consist mostly of active measures to 
detect an.J./or extinguish fires. Figure l 2 
Illustrates the range of management components 
available. Which system best fits the variety of 
situations faced by fire-protection planners is, at 
best, a matter of experience, and in general, 
guesswork. 
In large, government funded energy technology 
experiments, fire-management systems are defined by 
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recommended practice and standard documents generated 
by DOE. This guidance is constrained by lack of 
direct fire experience. Moreover, the types and 
sizes of fires expected in these systems are 
unknown. For these reasons DOE is supporting a study 
by the Fire Science Group (Hazards Control 
Department) of ILL to determine the fire hazards of 
current and future energy technology experiments, and 
the ability of accepted fire-management strategies to 
meet and negate the hazard. 
Approach and Analysis of the LLL System 
The knowledge required to adequately rate 
fire-management systems includes a sufficient 
understanding of: 
• The fire-risk variables. 
• The reliability of the fire-management system 
and system components. 
• The effectiveness of the countermeasures on 
demand. 
Me approached this task assuming that some of 
these parameters would be understood; however, this 
was not the case. Moreover, even if they were 
defined, we would have to provide for intangible 
modifiers such as: 
• Common mode failures (natural disasters, rodent 
attack, etc.). 
I Human error. 
• Impediments due to the potential for toxic 
exposure and/or release. 
We essentially ignored these intangible factors 
and proceeded to seek a consensus of current 
fire-risk concerns from operators of fusion 
experiments. Table l 3 lists the accumulation of 
fire-risk parameters as determined from our brief 
survey. The table is divided into categories that 
include near- and far-term fire risks for general 
energy technology experiments, and categories 
specific to inertial- and magnetic-confinement 
experiments. Abundant in this list are questions 
about the growth- and smoke-release rate of fires on 
materials common to fusion experiments. In a 
subsequent survey of fire growth models for 
residental fire-hazards analysis, hard data on fire 
growth rates were found to be crucial. For the major 
flammable materials resident in fusion experiments 
(electrical and thermal insulations), no flame spread 
data exists. 
Figure 2 4 gives a frame work for fire growth 
analysis that indicates the type of data needed for 
developing hypothetical fire scenarios. All of these 
factors are interactive, thus, with the data 
currently available, we can only predict the order of 
magnitude characteristics of fire growth. The growth 
parameters follow exponentially increasing functions 
and are roughly corroborated by industrial and 
military experimental fire experience. An important 
dependent fire growth parameter is instantaneous heat 
release, and given the rate of heat release we can 
calculate approximate temperature rise and 
temperature gradient in the plume gases and heat 
transfer to the ceiling of the structure. Radiant 
ignition of odja-.ent items and copious smoke 
production are "ikely, but we have yet no way of 
quantifying thesa factors without even very rough 
models. 
We thought that there would be abundant data 
available for assessing the reliability of existing 
and installed fire protection systems; however, we 
were again wrong. There was historical data 
available from insurance companies and trade 
associations that indicated sprinkler system 
reliability over a wide range of applications, but 
these data do not define critical components nor the 
consequence of failure of subcomponents to the 
overall system. (Note, when we refer to system 
reliability, we simply mean that the system operated 
at the proper time. Its effectiveness was not 
indicated 1n the data we obtained.) 
To assess the reliability of fire-management 
systems we applied the FTA to installed fire 
protection systems for fusion experiments at LLL. 
This analysis was applied to both wet- and dry-pipe 
sprinkler systems. In dry-pipe systems, water is not 
allowed above a special inlet valve to the system 
until a sprinkler head is fused (thermally opened). 
When this happens, the air pressure in the water 
conduit is released allowing water to enter the 
system via the inlet valve. A schematic of an LLL 
dry-pipe system is shown In Figure 3. A wet-pipe 
system contains water throughout the system at local 
water pressure. When the sprinkler head is fused 
water is released directly to the fire site. 
Dry-pipe systems are used in cold climates where 
freezing temperatures are possible; modified dry-pipe 
systems (like the one shown 1n Figure 3) have been 
designed to reduce the probability of inadvertent 
release of water to high-tension electrical 
components. To get water flow through the system, 
both a signal from the resident smoke detector and 
air-pressure release by fusing the sprinkler head 
must occur. Either event will cause a signal to be 
transmitted to the central emergency control panel, 
mobilizing the LLL Fire Department. This is, in 
fact, the desirable response, because we anticipate 
that the smoke detectors aro most likely to sense the 
combustion products of incipient fires before 
accelerated growth to high heat release occurs. 
Qualitative and quantitative FTA's of this 
fire-protection arrangement reveal that the 
electronic circuits of the zone- and fire-indicating 
units are critical couplers to the 
electrical/mechanical components of the system. At 
least 713 system failure modes were identified for a 
unit model of the entire fire-management scheme. 
Forty-two of the failure modes were single-point 
failures (i.e., a single component failure can result 
in the failure of the entire system). Almost half of 
these single point failures were in the electrical 
components of the zone- and fire-indicating units. 
Quantitative analysis of the system unavailability 
upon demand and the importance ranking of basic 
events and fault modes leading to system failure were 
calculated using available reliability data from: 
• The National Fire Protection Association 
• IEEE Standard 500 
• UKAEA Standards (United Kingdom) 
• Factory Mutual Insurance Corporation 
t Mash 1400 
» Facililty P&IE specification 
• Direct conversation with the maintenance crew 
and LLL Fire Department 
Using codes specific to quantitative FTA^»6 we 
calculated that the probability of this system 
failing on demand (i.e., in the event of a fire) is 
0.18 and that nine basic events contributed to system 
failure. 
A similar analysis was made of a laboratory 
wet-pipe system. Because of reduction in complexity 
of the response requirements, the reliability of this 
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system is substantially higher, and the probability 
of system failure 1s only 0.02 based on the same 
compunent-reliabllty data. The calculated 
probability of an accidental release of water was of 
the order of 10-•' per year for both systems. 
We compared our calculations with the available 
historical data. Our results were embarrassingly 
close to these published values (i.e., for wet-pipes 
we calculate a reliability of 98X and the average of 
historical data are 96X; similarly for dry-pfpe 
systems our calculations Indicate a reliability of 
82X while historical data averages 86X. We were 
unable to find any solid data for the probability of 
accidental release, however, inquiries of sprinkler 
manufacturers confirm that our calculated 
probabilities are of the Noht order. 
Based on the findings of this analysis for the 
modified dry-pipe system, LLL magnetic fusion 
administrators have authorised U s replacement by a 
more effective and economical wet-p1pe system. 
Relating the fire growth analysis to the response 
parameters of the fire management system shows a wide 
variation In the range of sprinkler response times. 
Because of the uncertainty 1n the model, the time 
range for Initiation of water application varies from 
8 t.o 30 minutes, fo, Indicated before, we expect that 
the smoke detectors would have already signaled the 
F1re Department, and their actions would negate the 
need for sprinkler activation.. 
A quantitative measure of the effectiveness of 
applying extinguishing techniques, by either the 
designed sprinkler system or the F1re Department is 
impossible because of potentially varying modifying 
factors. Experience and common sense tell us that 
the earli the fire suppression agent 1s applied to 
the fire, the quickei It is controlled. These ,. 
observations should have been sufficiently compelling 
to have motivated experimental operators and . 
administrators to plan and install optimum fire 
protection for their systems. But in this paper, we 
have illustrated two cases whert extensive parametric 
analysis, or experience with an accidental fire were 
required to supply the necessary leverage to upgrade 
the modifications of the fire-protection components 
to a more effective level. 
Applications and Conclusions 
One of the goals of this analysis is to develop a 
means of comparing the match between fire risk and 
the potential effectiveness of a fire-managment 
system. In generic fusion experiments, our approach 
is to construct a fault-tree model that reflects the 
reliability of components in a total fire-protection 
system. We then attempt to conceptually overlay a 
specific fault tree constructed for the facility we 
ere analyzing. Where our systems coincide, we can 
transpose our reliability factors and fire risk 
approximations directly. Where the subject system is 
completely unrelated, we take particular note and 
attempt to define and assess the effects of the 
unrelated factors. The following outline sketches 
our first cut analysis of the fire-protection 
stratagies of several contemporary fusion experiments. 
(A) Sandia EBFF 
Fire Hazard: Marx generators, capacitors, large 
quantities of cable insulation and dielectric 
fluid in open reservoir, frequent fiuid transfer, 
boiler room close to dielectric reservoir and 
fire main. Ventilation: HVAC. 
Detection/Suppression: Smoke detectors in screen 
room, central water-flow alarm, wet-pipe with 
AFFF*, 5-min Fire Department response, 'tandplpe, 
water reservoir. Reliability: Simple wet-pipe 
system for large fires «95Vdemand, high bay 40 
ft celling, small fire could cause damage before 
sprinkler alarm is activated. Effectiveness: 
Aerosol explosion could remove wet-pipe system, 
unknown potential of low-intensity fire. 
Modifiers: AFFF corrosion potential, maintenance 
errors (Marx generator service), weather could 
slow F1re Department response. 
(B) Princeton TFTR 
Fire Hazard: High energies, thermal and cable 
Insulation, local 3H concentration, electric 
arcs. Ventilation: HVAC. 
Detection/Suppression: Local and central alarm, 
preactlon dry-pipe sprinklers, smoke detectors, 
freon type extinguishers in specific and 
sensitive areas, 10 min F1re Department 
response. Reliability: Preactlon sprinklers 
sBBSX/demand": Effectiveness: Poor location of 
detectors and sprinkler heads could lead to large 
loss. Fire Department several miles away. 
Modifiers: Weather/traffic could slow Fire 
Department. 
(C) Lawrence Llvermore 2XIIB: 
Fire HazardT: Many wood structures, cable 
Insulation, plistic sheets and cable trays, 
(local) high-power densities. Ventilation: 
HVAC. Detection/Suppression: Local and central 
alarm, modified preactlon sprinkler system, smoke 
detectors throughout. Reliability: Modified 
dry-pipe preaction system «a2Vdemand (soon to 
be changed to total wet-pipe system). 
Effectiveness: Forty foot ceiling height could 
allow small fire to cause damage. Modifiers: 
Minimal due to dedicat. d systems. 
(D) Max Plank IPP: Tokamak and Stellerators, Iodine 
lasers. Fire Hazards: Cable and thermal 
insulation's^ Ventilation: HVAC. 
Detection/Suppression: Local alarm, few hose 
hookups. 10-15 min Garshing Fire Department 
response. Modifiers: Late detection, traffic, 
weather. 
(E) CEH-S Tokamak: Plasma studies. Fire Hazards: 
Cable and thermal i.isulation. Ventilation: 
Windows. Detection/Suppression': Thermal 
detectors, dry chemicals on carts, five men on 
site. Modifiers: Weather, multiple fires, late 
detection and inadequate suppression. 
(F) Culham MFE: 
Fire Hazards: Cable and thermal insulation and 
many experiments. Ventilation: Melt-out 
windows. Detection/Suppress i on: Eight-man 
patrol, minimal automatic detection, local alarm, 
manual standpipes. Modifiers: Fire Department 
remote from site. Obscuration of fire site in 
large fusion experimental area. 
This tabulation indicates that: 
• The combustible material load, and consequently 
the fire risk parameters, at early times are 
quite similar for all systems (E-beam open oil 
reservoirs excepted). 
• European fire protection systems rely primarily 
on early warning from fire detectors rather 
than automatic extinquishing systems. 
• Areas without dedicated fire-fighting personnel 
and equipment could suffer extensive property 
loss should the resident automatic 
extinquisning system fail. 
• The effect of unique features of experiments 
and experimental enclosures can be identified 
but not quantified at this stage of the 
analysis. 
• No human error modifiers are listed because of 
our Inability to locally place such factors in 
our analysis. 
We are currently engaged in research of the 
physical characteristics of: fire growth and smoke 
production by electrical insulations; fire dynamic 
Interaction with enclosures modified by various 
imposed ventilation changes; corrosion potential of 
smoke from various insulation polymers; and the 
minimum Ignition criteria of electrial insulation. 
With these data applied to our fire growth models, we 
should be better able to predict fire risk in fusion 
experiment enclosures, and as a result, have the key 
to assess the relative effectiveness of the total 
fire-management systems. 
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TABLE 1 
POTENTIAL FIRE HAZARD IN FEE AND FUSION POKER REACTORS (FPR) 
NEAR-TERM FAR-TERM 
General 
Lack of adequate fire protection measures during 
construction of FEE buildings. 
Unknown flammability characteristics of electrical 
and thermal insulations. Of specific concern: 
(1) Rates of; flame spread, heat release, smoke 
evaluation, in the configuration of their common 
use. 
(2) Toxic and Corrosive potential of the variety 
of smokes. 
(3) Shorting potential of pyrolized electrical 
insulation. 
Electrical conductivity of extfnguishants applied 
to apparatus holding high electrical charge. 
Early warning fire detectors that operate In 
ionizing radiation fields. 
Detonation and deflagration characteristics 
of dispersed aerosols of capacitor, trans­
former and vacuum oils. 
Potential for transient signal generation 
from burning cables to FEE and FPR. 
Combustion and extinguishing characteristics 
of liquid metals in condensed and vapor 
phase. 
Problems associated with Impurity extraction 
from liquid metal breeding and/or heat 
transfer media. 
Development of f1re-management systems that 
can discriminate between different types of 
fires. 
F1re hazards of FEE and FPR support 
facilities (I.e., cryogenic storage, 
extraction plants, pellet fabrication 
facilities). 
New electrical component interaction in 
complex control systems 
Magnetic Confinement" 
Mobile fire management for quick change 
capabilities due to experimental changes. 
Inert containment strategies for dielec­
tric oil reservoir applications. 
Corrosive potential of smokes from 
pyrolyzing insulations on sensitive 
electrical components. 
Retractable partitions to devide high bay 
areas into manageable zones in the event of 
fire alarms. 
Fire hazards in liquid metal heat transfer 
loops. 
Detection and extinguishment of fires due to 
3H release. 
Corrosive potential of smokes on laser 
components. 
Zonal fire-management systems specific optical 
to laser systems. 
Corrosive potential of extinguishants 
on laser optical components. 
